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Mortality-related processes are known to modulate late-life change in cognitive abilities, but it is an open
question whether and how precipitous declines with impending death generalize to other domains of
functioning. We investigated this notion by using 13-year longitudinal data from now-deceased partic-
ipants in the Berlin Aging Study (N  439; 70–103 years at first occasion; M  87 years). Using time
metrics of chronological age and time-to-death, we compared changes in key indicators of cognitive,
sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related domains. Across variables and domains, mortality
models revealed steeper average rates of change than age models. However, some domain indicators were
more prone to mortality-related change than others. Examining between-person differences, we found
that sociodemographic characteristics (surviving to an older age at death, being a woman, lower
socioeconomic status) and proxies of pathologies (comorbidities, disability, and suspected dementia)
related to lower levels of late-life functioning. In contrast, little evidence was found for correlates of
differential change. Our results illustrate both the pervasive nature of progressive processes leading
toward death and their domain specificity. Inquiries with more closely spaced multidomain measure-
ments are needed to identify invariant and variable aspects of the end-of-life “cascade.”
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Age-related, pathology-related, and mortality-related processes
contribute to trajectories of functional change at the end of life
(Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; Birren & Cunningham,
1985; Featherman & Petersen, 1986). Empirical support for pro-
nounced late-life deterioration with impending death has accumu-
lated primarily in examinations of cognitive abilities (for an over-
view, see Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006). Several recent studies
report that well-being also shows considerable late-life declines
(Berg, Hassing, Thorvadsson, & Johansson, 2011; Diehr, William-
son, Burke, & Psaty, 2002; Gerstorf et al., 2008, 2010; Gerstorf,
Ram, Röcke, Lindenberger, & Smith, 2008; Mroczek & Spiro,
2005; Palgi et al., 2010). Less is known about whether mortality-
related declines or other progressive processes leading toward
death (e.g., deteriorating health) are also present in domains other
than cognition and well-being. In this article, we provide an
empirical demonstration of the pervasiveness of mortality-related
decline using 13-year longitudinal data from now-deceased partic-
ipants in the Berlin Aging Study (BASE; N  439; 70–103 years
at first occasion; M  87 years). First, we examined end-of-life
changes in key indicators of function in six domains that broadly
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represent central systems (cognitive, sensory, physical, health,
social, and self-related functions) as age-related and as mortality-
related processes. Second, we examined whether and how sociode-
mographic characteristics (age at death, gender, socioeconomic
status [SES]) and proxies of pathologies (comorbidities, disability,
suspected dementia) related to between-person differences in late-
life functioning and change.
Age-Related Change
Normative age-related processes are often implicated as one of
the major driving forces underlying developmental change (see
Alwin, Hofer, & McCammon, 2006). To index how such processes
unfold, researchers describe and extract systematic within-person
changes in individuals’ behavior and experience as observed along
a time-from-birth or chronological age time axis. Building on or
using evidence of age-related deteriorations that are moderately to
strongly correlated with chronological age, a sizable body of
theoretical notions and empirical insights has accumulated regard-
ing normative trajectories of age-related changes that span across
cognitive, sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related func-
tions.
In the cognitive domain, two-component life span theories of
intelligence contend that age-related change trajectories of the
fluid mechanics begin to decline in middle adulthood (because of
underlying decrements in neurobiological functioning; Baltes et
al., 2006; Cattell, 1971; Horn, 1982). These conceptual arguments
are supported by a myriad of empirical reports documenting that
age-normative cumulative decline in performance on speeded cog-
nitive tasks commences relatively early in adulthood and shows
moderate to strong decrements in old age (Salthouse, 2004; Schaie,
2005).
In the sensory domain, it is known that the focusing ability of
the lens deteriorates with advancing age (Kline & Scialfa, 1996).
Steep age-related declines have repeatedly been documented for
visual acuity and particularly close vision (Fozard & Gordon-
Salant, 2001). For physical functioning, theories of physiological
wear and tear suggest that key parts of the body, such as cells and
tissues, wear out and break down from prolonged use (for discus-
sion, see Cristofalo, Tresini, Francis, & Volker, 1999). Treating
chronological age as a basic index of cumulative wear and tear,
various measures of physical functioning are known to evince
pronounced normative age-related declines (Crimmins, Hayward,
& Saito, 1996). For example, Christensen, Mackinnon, Korten,
and Jorm (2001) reported from the Canberra Study of Aging that
grip strength showed strong negative direct relationships with age.
Likewise, self-rated health, commonly considered a multidimen-
sional snapshot of past health experiences, current health condi-
tions, and future health expectations (Idler, 1993), has repeatedly
been found to decline with age (Sargent-Cox, Anstey, & Luszcz,
2010).
Theories of social development assert that qualitative aspects of
individuals’ social life, such as feeling socially integrated and
emotionally supported, are well preserved into old age
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Kahn & Antonucci,
1980). Empirical evidence supporting these conceptual arguments
is ubiquitous (Antonucci, 2001). For example, Hawkley and Ca-
cioppo (2007) concluded in their review that there are relatively
few age-related increases in perceptions of loneliness across most
of the adult life. Finally, theories of self-regulation and personal
control and empirical reports both suggest age-related increases in
the constraints people perceive on their ability to enact control
over their lives (Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Heckhausen &
Schulz, 1995). In the current study, we examine age-related
changes in multiple indicators of cognitive, sensory, physical,
health, social, and self-related functioning domains and expect that
these measures evince similar trajectories of age-related change to
those reported in earlier studies.
Mortality-Related Change
Late-life changes in functionality are often influenced not only
by age-related factors but also by mortality-related factors associ-
ated with impending death. Notions of terminal decline suggest
that mortality-related processes rise to the forefront at the end of
life and are the predominant cause of the accelerated functional
deteriorations that often accompany the last years and months
before death (Kleemeier, 1962; Riegel & Riegel, 1972). To index
how mortality-related processes unfold, researchers describe and
extract systematic within-person changes in individuals’ behavior
and experience along a time-to-death time axis.
The existence of precipitous, proximate-to-death declines has
received strong empirical support in the cognitive domain over the
past two decades (Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006). For example,
Wilson, Beckett, Bienias, Evans, and Bennett (2003) found that
participants in the Religious Orders Study had lower ability levels
and experienced pronounced deteriorations on a variety of cogni-
tive abilities during the last years of life (see also Sliwinski et al.,
2006; Wilson, Beck, Bienias, & Bennett, 2007). Several recent
studies have indicated that individuals’ well-being also declines
rapidly with impending death (Diehr et al., 2002; Mroczek &
Spiro, 2005; Palgi et al., 2010). Our own analyses of end-of-life
declines in life satisfaction among now-deceased participants in
the BASE revealed that, relative to age models, mortality models
accounted for more variance in between-person differences in
late-life change and also revealed by far steeper average rates of
decline (Gerstorf, Ram, Estabrook, et al., 2008). Our objective in
the current study was to examine whether and how pronounced
end-of-life changes are exhibited in other domains of functioning.
The literature on mortality-related processes in the cognitive and
well-being domains has identified a few candidate mortality-
related processes, including the accumulation of neuropathologies,
impairments of the central nervous systems, and the breakdown of
overall system integrity. Each of these factors can be expected to
have direct or indirect bearing on multiple domains. We thus
contend that the effects of mortality-related processes pervade
many domains of function, not just cognitive abilities and well-
being. To illustrate, common neuropathology conditions in old age
(e.g., Alzheimer’s disease [AD] or Lewy bodies) as well as the
deteriorating integrity of neurocognitive control systems can both
be expected to seriously impede efficient functioning of higher
level processes and thereby have domain-generalized rather than
domain-specific effects. Similarly, if one’s reserve capacity and
the integrated functioning of the system become increasingly com-
promised, scarce resources may be allocated to basic processes of
physiological functioning and maintenance rather than to mecha-
nisms less immediately relevant for survival (e.g., self-regulation;
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Extending the, thus far, limited examinations of mortality-
related change, our study provides an initial step toward better
understanding of the multidomain nature of terminal decline. To
do so, we evaluate age- and mortality-related representations for
describing late-life change across key indicators of central sys-
tems: cognitive, sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related
functions. Our aim was to provide a quantitative description of the
extent and temporal course of late-life change in multiple domains.
Our general expectation was that across all domains, changes that
manifest at the end-of-life are characterized not only as age-related
processes but also as mortality-related processes. At the same time,
we anticipate that the relative magnitude of aging- and mortality-
related effects is not uniform across the six domains targeted, and
some domains will be more prone to “attacks” from mortality-
related processes than others (see Fozard & Gordon-Salant, 2001;
Maier & Smith, 1999). For example, sensory functioning may
exhibit strong terminal decline effects comparable to those of fluid
cognitive abilities because higher order processing of visual infor-
mation and broad fluid abilities both rely on the integrity of the
prefrontal and medio-temporal areas of the brain (for a thorough
discussion of functional and etiological accounts of cognitive–
sensory links, see Lindenberger & Ghisletta, 2009). In contrast,
qualitative indicators of social life may be less strongly affected by
the detrimental effects of terminal decline. For example, socio-
emotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999) contends that
with increased limitations in future time perspective, people focus
on maintaining and optimizing interactions with more intimate
network members. Although chronological age has often been
used as a proxy for future time perspective, one may expect that
perceived limitations on one’s future time perspective should align
more closely with individuals’ objective proximity to death (see
Kotter-Gruehn, Gruehn, & Smith, 2010). If so, people close to
death may feel as socially integrated as (if not more so than)
people farther away from death. Although noting that there may be
some differences in the extent of decline between functional do-
mains, our general premise is that terminal decline is a pervasive
phenomenon that cuts across systems.
The Role of Sociodemographic Characteristics and
Proxies of Pathologies
The risk of decline is likely regulated by both sociodemo-
graphic and biological factors. Consistent with the view of
compromised biological plasticity and genetic reliability in
advanced ages (Baltes & Smith, 2003; Finch & Kirkwood,
2000), there is evidence to suggest that the pathways into
mortality for very old individuals are portended by relatively
stronger declines relative to individuals dying at earlier ages.
For example, Bäckman and MacDonald (2006) concluded in
their review of terminal cognitive decline research that older
age at death is generally associated with steeper declines.
Drawing from reports of gender differentials in morbidity in old
age (Moen, 1996), the years prior to death may be more
dysfunctional (e.g., drawn-out decline) for women than for
men. SES may also play a role in altering rates of change in core
functions because people draw from accumulated reserves and
resources when adjusting to late-life challenges. For example,
highly educated individuals may know of, have access to, and
be able to use and activate resources that help to get one’s needs
fulfilled for as long as possible and despite eventual difficulties
and limitations (Carver, 1998; Mirowsky & Ross, 2007; Salt-
house, 1991). Individuals with access to those resources may
show shallower rates of decline, whereas those without access
have fewer means to deal with late-life challenges and thereby
are more prone to severe and quick decline. Such resources
encompass finances, knowledge and literacy, as well as self-
regulation strategies. Borrowing from theories of cognitive
reserve, it is also possible that such resource mechanisms even
operate to compensate neurobiological degradation by using
more robust and less error-prone brain networks (Stern, 2002).
Processes that accrue with or are causally linked to disease
and/or disability can be assumed to play a key role in late-life
change, be it as moderator or mediator of decline (Birren &
Cunningham, 1985). For example, frailty-associated factors seri-
ously impede upon people’s capability to deal with the difficulties
imposed by the end of life, thereby relating to both a person’s level
of function and rate of decline in other domains. Such factors
include, but are not limited to, physical diseases and comorbidity,
disability, and various forms of clinical and preclinical stages of
dementia. To begin with, chronic health conditions are established
risk factors for lower levels of functioning on performance-based
measures (e.g., cognitive functioning; Verhaeghen, Borchelt, &
Smith, 2003) as well as indicators of self-related functioning (e.g.,
perceived control; Krause & Shaw, 2003). In a similar vein, one
repercussion of the multidirectional disablement process model
(Verbrugge & Jette, 1994) is that accumulated disability reveals
sizable effects on functional changes in several domains (see also
Anstey, Stankov, & Lord, 1993). Finally, there is debate in the
cognitive literature as to whether terminal decline primarily re-
flects the progression of AD and particularly its preclinical stages
(Bäckman & MacDonald, 2006). Given that older adults who die
with mild or moderate forms of cognitive impairment may not
meet the pathologic criteria for AD, it seems pivotal to target the
role of preclinical dementia for terminal decline. In sum, the
second objective in the current study was to identify factors that
contribute to between-person disparities in late-life functioning
and change. On the basis of notions of old-age vulnerabilities and
cumulative disadvantage, we expect that older age at death, being
a woman, being in lower socioeconomic strata, as well as indica-
tors of pathologies (comorbidities, disability, and suspected de-
mentia) all relate to lowered late-life functioning and steeper
end-of-life declines.
The Current Study
Relatively little is known about what aspects of late-life func-
tioning are prone to “attacks” from mortality-related processes and
what factors contribute to end-of-life decline. We use longitudinal
data from the BASE to examine the multidimensional nature of
late-life change. To broadly represent central characteristics of
individual functioning, we selected six domains and well-
established indicators thereof from the measurement battery of the
BASE. We pursue two sets of goals. First, we apply growth models
to characterize late-life change trajectories in key indicators of
cognitive, sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related func-
tions across chronological age and time-to-death to determine
whether mortality-related processes do indeed generalize across
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sociodemographic characteristics and proxies of pathologies as
correlates of mortality-related decline.
Method
We used seven-wave longitudinal data from deceased partici-
pants of the interdisciplinary BASE collected over 13 years. De-
tailed descriptions of the variables assessed and procedures used,
as well as information about the longitudinal samples and design,
can be found in Baltes and Mayer (1999) and Smith et al. (2002).
Below, we provide a brief overview.
Participants and Procedure
The total BASE sample at Time 1 (T1) comprised 516
participants who completed an intensive assessment protocol.
The sample was stratified by gender and age, with 43 men and
43 women in each of six different age brackets (70 –74, 75–79,
80 – 84, 85– 89, 90 –94, and 95 years; born between 1887 and
1922; age: M  84.92 years, SD  8.66, range  70 –103).
Over the next 13 years, participants who were alive and could
be located were asked to complete questionnaires and tests at
approximately 2-year intervals. With the exception of the geri-
atric medicine evaluations, all testing took place at the partic-
ipant’s place of residence (i.e., private household or institution)
and was carried out in individual face-to-face sessions by
trained research assistants and medical personnel. Sessions
required an average of 90 min and, when necessary, were split
into shorter units of assessment.
Although the original 516 sample was positively selected, the
amount of selection bias in terms of mean levels and (co)variance
structure was relatively small. Information about mortality status
and date of death for deceased participants has been updated
regularly from the Berlin city registry since study inception in
1990. Our information on death makes use of data from a March
2007 update, when, of the 516 sample, 439 participants were
known to have died, 57 were still alive, and mortality information
was missing for 20 participants who had moved out of the Berlin
area. As can be expected from a study of old and very old
individuals, sample attrition over time was sizable. The number of
individuals participating at each wave was as follows: At baseline
in 1990–1993 (T1): N  439, in 1993–1994 (Time 2 [T2]) n 
292, 1995–1996 (Time 3 [T3]) n 183, 1997–1998 (Time 4 [T4])
n  111, 2000 (Time 5 [T5]) n  48, 2004–2005 (Time 6 [T6])
n  13, and 2005 (Time 7 [T7]) n  6. T2 took place 1.93 years
(SD  0.69), T3 3.75 years (SD  0.64), T4 5.48 years (SD 
0.76), T5 8.89 years (SD 0.83), T6 12.62 years (SD 0.85), and
T7 13.13 years (SD  0.87) after T1, respectively. Of the partic-
ipants, 292, or 67% contributed two or more data points and thus
lend themselves to the examination of within-person change (M
observation period 2.25 years, SD 2.63; range 0–14 years).
However, extensive longitudinal data were available from only a
few participants (one wave of data: n  147; two waves: n  109;
three waves: n  72; four waves: n  63; five waves: n  35; six
waves: n 7; seven waves: n 6). We examined the longitudinal
selectivity of the BASE sample using an effect size metric that
indicates the degree to which individuals who survived and par-
ticipated longitudinally differed from the 516 sample in BASE at
T1 (see Lindenberger, Singer, & Baltes, 2002). For example, based
on the 111 deceased participants who provided data for four or
more occasions, we found that better performance on the Digit
Letter at T1 (0.61 SD units, with SD referring to that of the 516
sample), on the tests of close vision (0.48 SD) and grip strength
(0.40 SD), better self-rated health (0.16 SD), lower emotional
loneliness (0.21 SD) and more perceived control (0.25 SD),
younger age (0.78 SD), higher SES (0.17 SD), and fewer medical
diagnoses (0.25 SD) were all associated with subsequently lower
mortality and higher participation rates among survivors. Effects
of sample selectivity were primarily due to mortality (e.g., Digit
Letter: 72% of the total effect of .61 SD units) rather than dropout
for other reasons, increasing the viability of the deceased sample
for examination of mortality-related change.1 We note that the
attrition of the sample is a beneficial aspect of studying mortality-
related processes. By definition, mortality-related change can only
be extracted retrospectively from longitudinal data from individ-
uals with known death dates. Finally, the average age at death for
the 439 participants used in our analyses was 91.67 years (SD 
7.04; range  73–106 years). Participants died an average of 5.37
years (SD  3.86; range  90 days–16 years) after their initial
assessment (T1) and 2.40 years (SD  2.32; range  5 days–13
years) after their last assessment.
Measures
Working within the constraints of the measures included in the
longitudinal assessment battery of the BASE, we selected one
reliable and well-established indicator variable for each domain
under study. Acknowledging the heterogeneity of these domains,
we replicated the analysis and used another indicator (that was
available at multiple measurement occasions) for each domain.
These results are reported in the Appendix and are substantively
identical to those presented in the main text.
Outcomes. As a central index of cognitive functioning, we
used individuals’ repeated performance on the Digit Letter test.
The Digit Letter test closely resembles the Digit Symbol Substi-
tution test of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler,
1982). Throughout the duration of the test (3 min), a template with
nine digit-letter pairings was presented to the participants. Partic-
ipants were shown a series of digits (six per page) and were
required to name the corresponding letter pair, as fast as possible.
To index sensory functioning, we used a performance-based mea-
sure of close visual acuity. Close visual acuity was measured with
1 As one would expect, relative to those who had died, the 77 partici-
pants who survived (n 58) or had missing mortality information (n 19)
showed better performance on the Digit Letter at T1 (M  55.23, SD 
8.69 vs. M  49.01, SD  9.93), F(1, 474)  26.04; on the tests of close
vision (M  54.81, SD  8.38 vs. M  49.15, SD  10.03), F(1, 510) 
21.79; and grip strength (M  53.28, SD  10.37 vs. M  49.42, SD 
9.83), F(1, 508) 9.96); they reported better self-rated health (M 52.53,
SD 9.31 vs. M 50.00, SD 10.00), F(1, 514) 4.28; lower emotional
loneliness (M  47.12, SD  9.24 vs. M  50.51, SD  10.05),
F(1, 514)  7.62; and more perceived control (M  53.25, SD  8.10 vs.
M  49.43, SD  10.20), F(1, 513)  9.74; and were younger age (M 
77.02, SD  6.15 vs. M  86.30, SD  8.29), F(1, 514)  87.98, and
suffered from fewer medically diagnosed illnesses (M  44.85, SD  7.79
vs. M  50.90, SD  10.08), F(1, 514)  25.16, all ps  .05, whereas no
differences were found in SES (p  .10). In sum, as expected given their
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standard optometric procedures as the average performance across
right and left eyes when reading a standard Snellen chart presented
at reading distance. Following previous work in the BASE, we
used the best scores with or without corrective lenses because
corrective devices should filter out, to a certain degree, peripheral
variance (e.g., variance due to individual differences in the refrac-
tory properties of the lenses), thereby allowing for a more direct
assessment of the portion of sensory loss that is central-neuronal in
nature (see Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997). As an indicator of
physical functioning, we focused on upper-body function using
handgrip strength. Grip strength was assessed with standardized
dynamometry as the maximum force applied to a hand dynamom-
eter across six trials, three per hand. The force exerted was mea-
sured in kilograms. As a central indicator of health, we used
self-ratings of health. We computed a unit-weight composite of
answers to two questions asking participants to rate their current
physical health and their current mental health, using a 5-point
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (poor to 5 (very good). To index social
functioning, we focused on reports of loneliness. More specifi-
cally, four items selected from the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Rus-
sell, Cutrona, Rose, & Yurko, 1984) were used to assess aspects of
emotional loneliness, including feelings of isolation, being alone,
and being secluded from contact with others. Participants were
read each item aloud and asked to indicate how well items de-
scribed them using a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (does not
apply to me at all) to 5 (applies very well to me). As a central
indicator of self-related function, we selected perceived control as
measured using a unit-weighted composite of seven items; three
items assessing personal control over desirable outcomes (e.g., “I
can make sure that good things come my way”), and four items
assessing perceived others’ control over desirable and undesirable
outcomes (e.g., “The good things in my life are determined by
other people”). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to
which they agreed with each of the items, using a 5-point Likert-
scale ranging from 1 (does not apply to me at all) to 5 (applies very
well to me). Responses to items assessing perceived others’ control
were reverse coded so that higher scores reflect greater perceptions
of control. Note that (in contrast to all other measures used here)
data on perceived control were not available at T2.
Correlates. We examined age at death, gender, SES, comor-
bidities, disability, and suspected dementia as correlates of late-life
functionality and change. SES was measured using a unit-weighted
composite of three measures: (a) equivalent income, defined as the
net household income weighted by the number of people sharing
the household; (b) occupational prestige, based on a standard
rating scale for Germany; and (c) number of years of education.
Extent of comorbidities was measured as the number of physician-
observed diagnoses (determined in clinical examinations sup-
ported by additional blood and saliva laboratory assessments) of
moderate to severe chronic illnesses (according to the International
Classification of Diseases-9; for details, see Steinhagen-Thiessen
& Borchelt, 1999). Disability was recorded as whether or not a
participant reported needing assistance in carrying out basic activ-
ities of daily living (getting up, getting dressed, going to the toilet,
bathing, eating) at any point during the course of the study. Finally,
suspected dementia was indexed by age cohort-specific cutoffs on
the Short Mini-Mental State Examination (Klein et al., 1985;
range  0–18 points; 70–84 years:  12 points; 85 years:  11
points) at any point during the course of the study. Independent
clinical diagnoses of dementia in the BASE at T1 and T3 indicated
sufficient specificity and sensitivity of these cutoffs.
Data Preparation and Data Analysis
All measures were standardized to a T metric (M  50; SD 
10) using the T1 BASE sample as the reference (N  516). This
transformation provided a common metric for comparison
across domains. Individuals’ chronological age was noted for
each available assessment as the number of years since birth.
Time-to-death was noted for each available assessment as the
number of years remaining in that individuals’ life. Missing
data were accommodated using full information maximum like-
lihood under the usual missing at random assumptions under-
lying accelerated longitudinal designs (R. J. A. Little & Rubin,
1987).
To illustrate the layout of the data, descriptive statistics for one
of the domain indicators (the Digit Letter test) over age and
time-to-death are reported in Table 1. It can be seen that average
levels of cognitive functioning decline with both age and closeness
to death (e.g., M  57.29 at 10 years prior to death, M  44.90 in
the year of death). It may also be noted from Table 1 that obser-
vations were spread relatively equally across the three age decades
(70s: n  255, 80s: n  435; 90s: n  299), but were largely
obtained in the last 5 years of life (e.g., 58%, or n  569). The
correlation between age and time-to-death was of moderate size
(r  .47, p  .001), suggesting that older individuals were closer
to death (i.e., higher ages are closer to zero on the time-to-death
metric).
To examine our research questions, we first fitted separate
growth curve models for each indicator over chronological age and
effectively modeled between-person differences in how individu-
als’ cognitive, sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related
functions changed from age 70 to age 100 years. We proceeded in
an analogous fashion and fitted separate growth curve models for
the six indicators over time-to-death, modeling change as a func-
tion of impending mortality (i.e., up to 15 years prior to death).
These models were specified as,
functionti  0i  1itimeti  2itimeti2  eti, (1)
where person i’s function at time t, functionti, is a combination
of an individual-specific intercept parameter, 0i, individual-
specific linear and quadratic slope parameters, 1i and 2i, that
capture the linear and quadratic rates of change per year over
the selected time metric (age or time-to-death) and residual
error, eti. Following standard multilevel/latent growth modeling
procedures (Ram & Grimm, 2007; Singer & Willett, 2003),
individual-specific intercepts, 0i, and slopes, 1i and 2i,
(from the Level 1 model given in Equation 1) were modeled as:
0i  00  01T1timei  u0i,,
1i  10  11T1timei  u1i,, and
2i  20 (2)
(i.e., Level 2 model), where 00, 10, and 20 are sample means,
and u0i and u1i are individual deviations from those means that
are assumed to be multivariate normally distributed, correlated
with each other, and uncorrelated with the residual errors, eti.





































































































1809LATE-LIFE CHANGE: AGE VERSUS TIME-TO-DEATH
there were no significant between-person differences, and thus
they were not included in the final models. Similarly, cubic
terms were also included and tested, but were not significantly
different from zero for any of the domain indicators tested.
Between-person versions of the time metric, T1timei, were
included at Level 2 to accommodate nonconvergence between
within-person change and between-person differences (e.g., co-
hort effects: Participants who are alive and well to begin a
scientific study at age 85 may not necessarily be representative
of those who began the study at an earlier age and who may or
may not have participated in the study until reaching age 85;
see, e.g., Sliwinski, Hoffman, & Hofer, 2010). For example, in
the age-based model, we added chronological age at T1 (cen-
tered at 85 years) as a predictor of person-specific intercepts
and linear age-related rates of change at Level 2. In analogue,
time-to-death (centered at 2 years prior to death) at T1 was
included at Level 2 as a predictor of intercept and linear
time-to-death-related change.
To examine whether and how the between-person variance in
individuals’ change trajectories over time-to-death was associated
with sociodemographic characteristics and proxies for pathologies,
the time-to-death model was expanded by adding age at death, gender,
SES, comorbidities, disability, and suspected dementia as predictors
at the between-person level (Level 2). These variables were effect
coded/centered so that the regression parameters indicated the average
trajectory (across all individuals) and the extent of differences asso-
ciated with a particular variable (rather than for a particular group).
Negative parameters indicate differences at the “disadvantage” of
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for the Cognitive Indicator (Digit Letter) Over Age and Time-to-Death
Chronological age Time-to-death
Age n Estimate SE Years before
death
n Estimate SE
Between-person variance 53.42 7.93 5.49 0.61
Within-person variance 7.93 0.46 7.53 0.42
ICC .87 .42
M SD M SD
70 5 51.05 7.80 16 2 51.46 8.69
71 9 58.55 6.80 15 11 59.96 6.35
72 15 58.26 7.14 14 14 55.04 9.26
73 13 54.69 10.43 13 24 55.08 9.41
74 27 56.12 7.85 12 27 57.63 7.95
75 31 55.98 7.49 11 27 56.83 6.55
76 32 56.56 8.24 10 41 57.29 6.85
77 25 55.23 8.68 9 42 54.43 9.36
78 38 54.65 8.32 8 50 53.32 8.84
79 41 54.45 8.16 7 63 53.72 8.56
80 46 52.61 9.26 6 72 51.20 10.65
81 39 52.83 8.62 5 93 50.44 9.32
82 45 53.54 9.34 4 114 48.22 9.44
83 41 51.60 7.72 3 116 47.41 8.96
84 40 52.92 8.90 2 129 45.98 10.52
85 57 52.25 9.63 1 124 45.90 9.96
86 45 48.42 8.67 0 40 44.92 10.29
87 42 49.44 11.15
88 46 49.39 9.95
89 37 48.42 9.99
90 32 48.64 8.66
91 35 47.09 9.71
92 31 46.06 9.78
93 29 46.19 9.19
94 19 41.52 9.14
95 37 42.24 9.69
96 29 43.02 8.51
97 35 43.65 9.11
98 18 42.39 8.32
99 19 38.51 7.98
100 14 43.02 9.03
101 10 41.87 9.05
102 4 39.09 16.12
103 1 53.51 —
104 1 24.84 —
105 1 39.51 —
Note. N  404 who provided 989 observations. T-scores standardized to cross-sectional BASE sample at Time 1 (n  516, M  50, SD  10). ICC 





































































































1810 GERSTORF, RAM, LINDENBERGER, AND SMITH
individuals surviving to an older age, women, those with lower SES,
those with more comorbidities, disabled participants, and those with
suspected dementia. The expanded model took the form,
0i  00  01age of deathi  02SESi  03genderi
 04comorbiditiesi  05disabilityi
 06suspected dementiai  u0i,
and
1i  10  11age at deathi  12SESi  13genderi
 14comorbiditiesi  15disabilityi
 16suspected dementiai u1i. (3)
For self-rated health, emotional loneliness, and perceived con-
trol, main effects on the linear change trajectory were tested in
absence of the random effects. We also included main effects of
each correlate on the curvature of the average change trajectories
(i.e., quadratic change). Because five of the six correlates did not
reveal reliable differences on any domain indicator in those anal-
yses, we only report results for the single correlate that evinced
significant differences in the quadratic term of change.
All models were fit to the data using SAS (Proc Mixed; R. C.
Littell, Miliken, Stoup, & Wolfinger, 1996). The time variable was
centered at age 85 years in the age-related change models, and at
2 years prior to death in the mortality-related change models. We
note that the correlates included in our models represent attrition-
informative variables, which helped to accommodate longitudinal
selectivity under the assumption that incomplete data were missing
at random (i.e., missingness may have been related to these vari-
ables; McArdle, 1994).
Results
All six domain indicators exhibited a sizable proportion of
within-person variation over time, ranging between .21 for the
Digit Letter test and .52 for close vision. Because age and time-
to-death models differ in the between-persons portion of the
model, we also examined the proportion of between-person dif-
ferences in levels and rates of change that are accounted for by
cross-sectional age differences and cross-sectional time-to-death
differences. To do so, we evaluated the relative amount of variance
that heterogeneity in age or time-to-death accounted for (see the
intraclass correlations in Table 1). Of particular note was that
between-person variance in age (53.42) was almost 10 times larger
than variance in time-to-death (5.49). This reflects the use of
typical sample selection strategies that attempt to maximize age
heterogeneity (here, across old age) while implicitly reducing
heterogeneity in time-to-death.
Age- and Mortality-Related Change Trajectories in
Multiple Domains of Functioning
Table 2 summarizes the fixed effects (mean estimates) and
random effects (variance estimates) of both age and time-to-death
growth curve models for each of the six domain indicators. For a
considerable number of (primarily age-related) models, we found
significant associations between T1 and the time metric used (age
or time-to-death), indicating that the cross-sectional age/time-to-
death differences observed are, on average, not equivalent to the
longitudinal age/time-to-death changes observed (i.e., presence of
age or time-to-death-based selection). For most variables, we
found evidence of positive selection (e.g., Digit Letter  0.19 and
0.04 for intercepts and slopes, respectively), but for a few there
was some negative selection (e.g., grip gtrength  0.23 and
0.03). Given the prevalence of these effects, they were retained
through evaluation of the time metrics.
To describe late-life change over age and time-to-death, we ran
models with each time metric and evaluated the additional amount
of explained variance when either age or time-to-death was added
to the within-person (Level 1) portion of the model. Following
Snijders and Bosker (1999), this is formally conceptualized as the
proportional reduction of prediction error (i.e., pseudo R2).2 For
the objective, performance-based variables of Digit Letter, close
vision, and grip strength, the relative proportion of variance ex-
plained tended to be higher for the time-to-death metric relative to
the age metric. For the Digit Letter, for example, the change in
pseudo-R2 was 0.490 for the time-to-death metric as compared
with 0.390 for the age metric. For self-report variables of self-rated
health, loneliness, and perceived control, the amount of explained
variance was more even, suggesting that both age- and mortality-
related processes contribute to between-person differences in late-
life change in these domains. For example, pseudo-R2 for loneli-
ness was 0.133 for the time-to-death metric as compared with
0.125 for the age metric.
To examine the total variance explained by these models, we
also estimated additional models over time-in-study, with age or
time-to-death at T1 as a Level 2 predictor. The squared correlation
between the actual outcomes and the outcomes predicted by the
fixed effects in these models revealed for the Digit Letter, for
example, few differences (r  .44 over age vs. r  .40 over
time-to-death). Interpreting this total variance explained in the
context of our earlier findings of larger between-person differences
in age than in time-to-death suggests that it takes some 50 years of
age variance to describe a bit more about late-life change in a
central indicator of cognitive abilities than what 5 years of time-
to-death variance describes. The corresponding figures for the
other domain indicators revealed a similar picture (close vision
over age: r  .45; close vision over time-to-death: r  .38; grip
strength over age: r  .48; grip strength over time-to-death: r 
.24; self-rated health over age: r  .13; self-rated health over
time-to-death: r  .19; loneliness over age: r  .29; loneliness
over time-to-death: r  .19; perceived control over age: r  .27;
perceived control over time-to-death: r  .20).
In the next step of the analysis, we considered average rates of
late-life change. The pattern is highly consistent across the six
measures targeted, suggesting that typical rates of change associ-
2 As recommended by Snijders and Bosker (1999, pp. 99–105), we
calculated the explained proportion of within-person variance as
pseudo-R2  1 (	e(c)2 /	e(u)2 ), (4) where 	e(u)2 is the residual within-person
variance obtained from an unconditional or intercept-only model and 	e(c)2
is the parallel term from the conditional model that includes the time
variable, age or time-to-death. The residual within-person variances of the
unconditional model were as follows: Digit Letter, 	e(u)2  22.20; close
vision, 	e(u)2  43.98; grip strength, 	e(u)2  20.56; self-rated health, 	e(u)2 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1812 GERSTORF, RAM, LINDENBERGER, AND SMITH
ated with impending death were steeper than those related to
chronological age. For example, the linear component of
mortality-related decline for the Digit Letter amounted to more
than 1.5 standard deviations per 10 years (e.g., 10  –1.60 for
time-to-death vs. 10  0.83 for age) with some concave cur-
vature (20  0.08 vs. 20  0.04 for age). In relative terms,
the shallowest rates of late-life change were evinced by emotional
loneliness, but even for this dimension, the average mortality-
related increases (0.49 T-score units per year) were more pro-
nounced than the average age-related increases (0.35 T-score units
per year). To illustrate, Figures 1 and 2 contrast the typical age-
related and mortality-related change trajectories for the six indicators
of cognitive, sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related func-
tions. Across domains, mortality-related models revealed steeper av-
erage rates of change than age-related models by a factor of between
1.4 (loneliness) and 2.5 (close vision). As well, the extent of discern-
ible between-person differences in rates of change differed between
domain indicators (see Table 2).
The Role of Sociodemographic Characteristics and
Proxies of Pathologies
Results from models examining how sociodemographic charac-
teristics and proxies of pathologies are associated with between-
person differences in late-life functioning and change are reported
in Table 3. Our findings revealed that surviving to an older age,
being a woman, and lower SES, as well as comorbidities, disabil-
ity, and suspected dementia were indeed associated with lower
late-life levels of functioning, whereas we found relatively few
correlates of late-life changes. More specifically, age at death and
SES both related to level differences on four or more domain
indicators at 2 years before death. For example, surviving to an
older age at death was associated with lower levels of Digit Letter
performance (01 0.45), visual acuity (01 0.34), and grip
strength (01  0.39), as well as more emotional loneliness
(01  0.22) and lower perceived control (01  0.20). In
addition, persons who died at an older age were found to show
steeper declines on the Digit Letter (11  0.03), whereas older
age related to less pronounced decline on grip strength (11 
0.02), and higher SES was related to a somewhat steeper decline in
visual acuity (120.02). For gender, we found that women had
lower grip strength (03  9.72), and reported lower health
(03  1.87), more loneliness (03  1.65), and lower perceived
control (03 2.74) than men. Women also showed slightly less
decline in grip strength with approaching death (13  0.49),
perhaps reflecting some floor effects.
For comorbidities, our results indicate that participants with
more moderate to severe chronic illnesses had lower grip strength
(04  0.09), lower self-reported health (04  0.09), and
reported higher levels of loneliness (03  0.11). Greater number
of physical diseases was also related to a steeper decline in grip
strength (14  0.01). The presence of disability was associated
with lower performance on the Digit Letter (05  2.98), grip
strength (05  1.66), and reports of lower perceived control
(05  4.46). Disabled participants also declined more strongly
on the Digit Letter (150.32) and grip strength (150.29).
Finally, participants suffering from suspected dementia performed
lower on the Digit Letter (06  6.68) and the grip strength tests
(06  0.85) and, as to be expected, showed steeper linear and
quadratic rates of change on the Digit Letter test (16 0.59 and
17  0.06). Interestingly, suspected dementia also related to
shallower declines on self-rated health (16  0.37) and perceived
control (16  0.57). The reduction in unexplained variance in
intercepts and slopes was used to quantify the contribution of the
predictors along an effect size-type metric. As can be seen in Table
3, the correlates accounted for substantial amounts of variance
(e.g., Digit Letter intercept variance reduction  48%; slope 
38%). Overall, our results indicate that sociodemographic charac-
teristics and proxies of pathologies were independently related to
late-life levels of functioning, but were not independently related
to differential rates of change.
Discussion
Our objective was to examine the systemic nature of late-life
change. To do so, we applied growth models to 13-year longitu-
dinal data from 439 now-deceased participants in the BASE to
examine age-related and mortality-related change in cognitive,
sensory, physical, health, social, and self-related functions. Results
revealed that late-life changes in performance-based variables are
primarily driven by mortality-related processes, whereas changes
in self-report variables are perhaps driven more evenly by both
age- and mortality-related processes. Relative to age-related mod-
els, mortality-related models revealed steeper typical rates of
change consistently across all domains. At the same time, the
magnitude of aging- and mortality-related effects varied widely,
with some domains being more prone to exhibit mortality-related
change than others. Targeting correlates of between-person dispar-
ities, we found that sociodemographic characteristics (surviving to
an older age at death, being a woman, lower SES) and proxies of
pathologies (comorbidities, disability, suspected dementia) were
related to lower late-life functioning, whereas little evidence was
found for correlates of differential change. We take our results to
illustrate the pervasive nature of progressive processes leading
toward death, but also the domain specificity of the size of and
mechanisms underlying those effects. In the Discussion, we high-
light the need for more systemic and integrated inquiries as well as
more closely spaced measurements that may indicate how multiple
aspects of cognitive, psychosocial, and physical function unfold
together in an end-of-life “cascade.”
Age- and Mortality-Related Change Trajectories in
Multiple Domains of Functioning
Aging and dying are, by definition, time-related processes. The
metric by which time is indexed can be considered a vehicle
representing and condensing a particular complex of processes
(see Wohlwill, 1973, and discussion in Ram, Gerstorf, Fauth,
Zarit, & Malmberg, 2010). Our analyses suggest that differences in
change in performance-based indicators of cognitive, sensory, and
physical health can be efficiently described by differences in
time-to-death, whereas self-report data can be described well by
either age or time-to-death differences. Although we did see sim-
ilarities across domains and measures, it is conceivable and likely
that other indicators in each domain can be found that are less
prone to exhibiting the effects of mortality-related processes than
we found for the 12 indicators used herein. For example, the





































































































1813LATE-LIFE CHANGE: AGE VERSUS TIME-TO-DEATH
Figure 1. Individual (thin lines) and typical (thick lines) late-life trajectories of change for indicators of
cognitive functioning (upper panel: Digit Letter), sensory functioning (middle panel: Close Vision), and physical
functioning (lower panel: Grip strength) over chronological age (left-hand panels) and time-to-death (right-hand






































































































1814 GERSTORF, RAM, LINDENBERGER, AND SMITH
Figure 2. Individual (thin lines) and typical (thick lines) late-life trajectories of change for indicators of health
(upper panel: Subjective Health), social functioning (middle panel: Emotional Loneliness), and self-related
functioning (lower panel: Perceived Control) over chronological age (left-hand panels) and time-to-death
(right-hand panels). Across domains, mortality-related models revealed steeper average rates of late-life change





































































































1815LATE-LIFE CHANGE: AGE VERSUS TIME-TO-DEATH
Appendix) were primarily driven by positive affect, whereas neg-
ative affect remained relatively flat both over chronological age
and time-to-death. Given that the sensitivity of the negative affect
items of the Positve and Negative Affect Scheudule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) in capturing within-person
change is relatively low, we do not want to overinterpret the
apparent discrepancy between positive and negative affect. De-
scriptively, this finding may point to the existence of variables/
domains that are less affected by the deleterious late-life changes
seen in many other areas of late life.
Included in our study were domains known to be sensitive to
age-related change throughout adulthood, and domains that are
relatively age-insensitive. For example, the increasing rigidity of
the crystalline lens is known to reduce the eye’s capacity to focus
on very near objects—with age-related decrements in close visual
acuity already apparent by mid-adulthood (see Lindenberger &
Baltes, 1997). In contrast, we also examined more qualitative
aspects of social support, such as feelings of loneliness, or self-
related function, such as perceived control, that typically show
rather minor age-related change (Antonucci, 2001; Lachman,
2006). Although the average rates of change differed across the six
domains targeted here, the general pattern suggested that all do-
mains show steep mortality-related change. Our study is one of the
first reports (for a notable exception, see Diehr et al., 2002) to
demonstrate empirically that mortality-related processes are a per-
vasive phenomenon that affects many different domains. Consis-
tent with theoretically based expectations, the magnitude of aging-
and mortality-related effects was not uniform across the six do-
mains examined. This finding can be interpreted to indicate that
different constellations of factors contribute to change in each
domain. Some domains may be more related to biological-level
processes (e.g., sensory), whereas other domains are more strongly
affected by social-level processes (e.g., loneliness), and still others
by some combination of these as well as physical health and frailty
(e.g., self-related). Following Baltes and Smith (2003), dying in
late life expresses the most incomplete aspect of human ontogeny.
Rather than following a biological program, mortality-related pro-
cesses may operate as chaotic systemic dysregulation that contrib-
ute to the emergence (or enhancement) of associations between
previously independent processes and the breakdown of associa-
tions that were previously present (Rieckmann et al., 2011). It is an
open question whether such breakdown is triggered by or a pre-
cursor of surpassing lower limits of performance or behavior that
foreshadow imminent death (see discussion of lethal limits in
Riegel & Riegel, 1972). Our study is primarily descriptive in
nature and was not designed to tether mortality-related changes to
particular causal mechanisms. More process-oriented studies are
needed to thoroughly address the above speculations.
Table 3














Variable Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Fixed effects
Intercept, 00 46.13 (0.40) 44.95 (0.39) 48.08 (0.27) 47.43 (0.44) 51.66 (0.50) 47.50 (0.50)
Time-to-death, 10 1.56 (0.11) 1.46 (0.14) 0.84 (0.10) 0.86 (0.16) 0.46 (0.17) 0.79 (0.18)
Time-to-death220 0.07 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02)
Age at death, 01 0.45 (0.06) 0.34 (0.06) 0.39 (0.04) 0.09 (0.06) 0.22 (0.07) 0.20 (0.07)
SES, 02 0.25 (0.04) 0.09 (0.04) 0.07 (0.03) 0.08 (0.04) 0.14 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
Women, 03 0.49 (0.81) 1.44 (0.78) 9.72 (0.56) 1.87 (0.90) 1.65 (0.99) 2.74 (0.99)
Comorbidities, 04 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.09 (0.03) 0.09 (0.04) 0.11 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05)
Disability, 05 2.98 (0.85) 1.52 (0.82) 1.66 (0.59) 0.81 (0.95) 0.80 (1.05) 4.46 (1.05)
Sus. dementia, 06 6.68 (0.84) 0.99 (0.81) 0.85 (0.58) 1.23 (0.93) 0.67 (1.03) 1.31 (1.03)
Age at Death 
 Time-to-Death, 11 0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
SES 
 Time-to-Death, 12 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Women 
 Time-to-Death, 13 0.04 (0.14) 0.01 (0.17) 0.49 (0.11) 0.19 (0.16) 0.22 (0.16) 0.15 (0.17)
Comorbidities 
 Time-to-Death, 14 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Disability 
 Time-to-Death, 15 0.32 (0.15) 0.18 (0.19) 0.29 (0.12) 0.07 (0.18) 0.24 (0.17) 0.04 (0.18)
Sus. Dementia 
 Time-to-Death, 16 0.59 (0.23) 0.26 (0.18) 0.04 (0.11) 0.37 (0.17) 0.01 (0.17) 0.57 (0.18)
Sus. Dementia 
 Time-to-Death2, 17 0.06 (0.02) — — — — —
Random effects
Intercept, 	u02 47.33 (4.31) 36.69 (4.41) 17.19 (2.18) 45.84 (4.92) 63.40 (7.45) 59.38 (7.59)
Time-to-death, 	u12 0.34 (0.11) 0.62 (0.15) 0.01 (0.00) —a 0.07 (0.14) 0.03 (0.18)
Cov. Intercept 
 Time-to-Death, 	u0u1 1.56 (0.54) 2.72 (0.69) 0.37 (0.26) —a 1.42 (0.98) 0.53 (1.00)
Explained variance (between person)
In intercept, 	u02 .48 .28 .72 .13 .15 .14
In time-to-death, 	u12 .38 .26 .94 —a —a —a
Residual, 	e2 11.47 (0.83) 26.89 (1.80) 17.47 (0.97) 44.75 (2.51) 28.36 (2.87) 32.05 (3.53)
Note. Ns range between 404 (Digit Letter) and 438 (perceived control) who provided between 739 (perceived control) and 1,076 observations (close
vision). Unstandardized estimates and standard errors are presented. Intercept is located at 2 years prior to death. Level 2 versions of time-to-death were
not included because many of these were previously found to be nonsignificant. SES  socioeconomic status; Sus. Dementia  Suspected dementia; Cov.
intercept  Covariance intercept. Dashes indicate that effect was not estimated.
a For model convergence, variance of time-to-death and Covariance Intercept 
 Time-to-Death could not be estimated.





































































































1816 GERSTORF, RAM, LINDENBERGER, AND SMITH
If our general pattern of results were corroborated in future
studies, important implications arise for the study of aging and late
life. Dying appears to include processes that are not (fully) cap-
tured in examinations of normative age-graded processes. The
nominal differences in the rates of change obtained in the age and
time-to-death models (e.g., self-rated health: 0.54 T-score units
per year for age vs.0.91 T-score units per year for time-to-death)
provide a rough quantification of the differences between
mortality-related and age-related effects (Sliwinski et al., 2006).
We note, however, that time-to-death is highly similar to age in
that both are time-related catch-all variables that serve as a proxy
for how a variety of underlying factors progress through time. The
crucial task for future research is to move away from such time-
related representations and toward an explicit consideration of how
underlying mechanisms unfold (e.g., accumulating pathologies or
disability).
The Role of Sociodemographic Characteristics and
Proxies of Pathologies
Over and above the typical rates of late-life change, our models
also revealed sizable between-person differences in the rate of
mortality-related decline. Our findings indicate that sociodemo-
graphic characteristics and proxies of pathologies both play a
pivotal role in late-life functioning and change, but also suggest
that much more needs to be learned about how differences in
mortality-related change accrue (using study designs that have
better power to detect correlates of change).
Our results on the correlates of late-life function and change are
in line with extant reports from age-based investigations. Although
we expected that mortality and pathology burden are the most
important drivers of late-life change across the domains consid-
ered, we also acknowledged that the size of these effects likely
differs with chronological age. For example, consistent with the
view that the oldest old are at the limits of their adaptive capacity,
the literature suggests an increased likelihood and contribution of
pathology-based dysfunctionality in advanced old age relative to
earlier phases of old age (see Baltes & Smith, 2003). In line with
this reasoning, we found that impending mortality exerts more
detrimental effects on functionality in older ages. Regarding gen-
der, Smith, Borchelt, et al. (2002) reported from an earlier analysis
in the BASE that handgrip strength of 70-year-old men was, on
average, 21 kg, whereas for the typical 70-year-old woman, it was
8 kg. At age 90, this was reduced to an average of 12 kg for men
and 2 kg for women. At 2 years prior to death, we found the same
pattern with men being physically stronger than women, an esti-
mated effect that amounted to almost a full standard deviation (see
Table 3, or 13.2 kg for men vs. 3.8 kg for women). Finally, our
results also corroborate that people in higher socioeconomic strata
face the challenges of late life at higher functional levels (for
discussion, see Mirowsky & Ross, 2007). We note, however, that
generalizability may be limited from data gathered from a metro-
politan sample of residents of the former city of West Berlin with
its unique historic constellation (Baltes & Mayer, 1999).
To move toward a more integrated understanding of late-life
change, we examined how outcomes of pathologies impact
mortality-related change. We targeted burdens imposed by medi-
cally diagnosed moderate to severe physical illnesses as well as
prevalence of disability and suspected dementia throughout the
course of our study. Several of these burdens were found to show
reliable associations with between-person differences in late-life
function and rates of change. For example, persons suffering from
disability reported levels of perceived control at 2 years prior to
death that were almost half a standard deviation below those of
nondisabled participants. These disabled participants also showed
steeper mortality-related cognitive declines than persons who re-
mained free of disability throughout their lives. We take these
results to highlight the utility of targeting the role that pathologies-
related processes play in the rate of late-life deterioration.
Several notes of caution must be conveyed. First, additional
mechanisms appear to be at work, as exemplified by our finding
that cognitive impairments were associated with shallower late-life
declines in self-rated health and perceived control. It is possible
that people who are cognitively impaired may be less able to
accurately assess their health or level of control. Second, the result
that pathologies and disability were not consistently linked with
steeper end-of-life change across all domains can be interpreted as
another indication of the domain specificity of the mechanisms
underlying those changes. Alternatively, these discrepancies may
simply indicate that the currently available measures and designs
are not well suited to examine how the processes leading toward
death unfold over time. For example, 2-year spacing of measure-
ment occasions may be too long to fully capture any systematic
local “accelerations” in how mortality-related processes progress.
Third, we treated pathologies as a time-invariant between-person
characteristic. A crucial next step would be to shift toward con-
sidering pathologies as a time-varying within-person characteristic
that develops over time, and how the ongoing accumulation (or
reduction) of diseases and disability affects mortality-related func-
tional changes. To illustrate, although prominent biopsychosocial
theories of late life implicate disablement as a major force under-
lying developmental change (Verbrugge & Jette, 1994), looking at
disability in a more process-oriented manner has rarely been done,
probably because an operationalization of the disablement process
approach requires measures that track the continuous progression
of disability. Under the assumption that pathologies indeed form
entities that are etiologically distinct from other syndromes pre-
ceding death, aligning functional changes in the six domains
considered along the timing and progression of pathologies should
yield better descriptions than a time-to-death metric because this
index is conceptually closer to the underlying mechanisms than is
mortality (Ram et al., 2010).
Limitations and Outlook
We selected the six domains examined in this study to broadly
sample key functional systems at the end of life. Per domain, we
chose a measure that is established in research on old age and, with
an interest in within-person change, was available at multiple
measurement occasions. We acknowledge that our selection was
restricted by the indicators that were included in the longitudinal
assessment battery of the BASE and that the inclusion of both
further indicators per domain (e.g., number of medical diagnoses)
and an extension of the domains considered would have been
feasible (e.g., activities, motivation, emotion regulation, brain ef-
ficiency). We also note that our focus on medically diagnosed
physical illnesses at baseline assessment has certainly been a
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offset the limitations imposed by the lack of reliable data on causes
of death (Maudsley & Williams, 1996). For example, cause of
death and the specific pathologies that accumulate may differen-
tiate between various forms of decline. Individuals dying from
neoplasms may show slow but steady decline, whereas people
dying from acute vascular diseases (stroke or heart attack) may
exhibit exacerbated decline, and a third group of people dying
from accidents may show no or minimal signs of decline because
their bodies and minds have not had the chance to manifest the full
force of mortality-related processes (see MacDonald, Hultsch, &
Dixon, 2011).
Given the relatively unidirectional results of our study regarding
the nature of late-life change, a natural next step is to target the
overlap of and possibly common mechanisms underlying late-life
change between functional domains. One way to do so would have
been to apply multivariate growth models and examine interrela-
tions between the simultaneously estimated level and change fac-
tors across the six domains of functioning (for examples regarding
age-related changes, see Ghisletta, Rabbitt, Lunn, & Lindenberger,
2012; Tucker-Drob, 2011). However, three of the six domain
indicators did not reveal reliable between-person differences in
change, thereby precluding this route of investigation. We caution
that this may not necessarily represent a substantive phenomenon,
but rather a lack of statistical power to examine the question of
interest (Hertzog, Lindenberger, Ghisletta, & von Oertzen, 2006).
In addition, although we modeled quadratic trends, the ability to
detect between-person differences in those trends was limited by
the fact that relatively few participants provided four or more data
points (111 participants, 25% of the sample). With more data
points and more closely spaced assessments, notions of terminal
decline could be operationalized even more directly via multiphase
models of change that estimate the point of onset of terminal
decline and between-person differences therein (see, e.g., Gerstorf,
Ram, Estabrook, et al., 2008). Furthermore, the modeling approach
used in this study could be complemented by models that combine
longitudinal growth curve modeling with survival analyses to
estimate the influence that level and change in the constructs of
interest have on age at death (e.g., Ghisletta, McArdle, & Linden-
berger, 2006). Finally, inspired by work in neighboring disciplines
(e.g., Baudisch, 2011), it may be worthwhile to fit models of aging
and mortality risk that are nonlinear in the parameters (e.g., expo-
nential decline functions). More generally, articulating and testing
multidimensional notions of late-life change will expand the the-
oretical framework from which terminal decline has been studied
and provide an integrated picture of how and potential reasons why
some individuals age more successfully than others (e.g., experi-
ence less decline prior to death). The results of this study provide
an impetus for future inquiry of how terminal decline proceeds
systemically and at multiple levels of study.
In closing, to eventually inform the design of prevention and
intervention efforts, it is pivotal to provide a correct description of
the actual amount of late-life declines. Thoroughly demonstrating
that late-life declines are much more serious and steeper as com-
pared with what one would expect on the basis of extant age
models may alert society and policy makers to this largely unno-
ticed phenomena and to eventually allocate the resources neces-
sary that may help alleviate those declines in the future. For
example, knowing that a person has entered the death track ideally
does not affect the net sum of health care expenditures, but the way
those expenditures are made. Through a careful and well-balanced
strategy, it may well be possible to devote those resources toward
maintaining quality of life and allowing the person to die with a
sense of dignity rather than toward extending the length of life for
as long as possible. To live up to this promise, we need to move
toward prospective models that predict mortality risk as a function
of decline and that pinpoint the degree to which late-life decre-
ments in one domain coincide with late-life decrements in other
domains and how accumulating pathologies overlap with and
contribute to mortality-related changes.
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Growth Models for Alternative Indicators of Cognitive, Sensory, Physical, Health, Social, and Self-Related
Functions Over Age and Time-to-Death
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Fixed effects Level 2 Random effects Model fit















Age 50.41 (0.62) 0.33 (0.09) 0.03 (0.01) 0.23 (0.10) 0.04 (0.01) 61.26 (5.62) 0.06 (0.05) 0.07 (0.33) 24.32 (1.45) .147
95% CI [0.81, 0.15]
Mortality 49.05 (0.57) 1.16 (0.14) 0.12 (0.02) 0.38 (0.13) 0.14 (0.03) 76.15 (6.66) 0.25 (0.11) 2.14 (0.72) 22.07 (1.39) .226
95% CI [2.14, 0.18]
Sensory: Hearing
acuity
Age 48.79 (0.55) 0.37 (0.08) 0.04 (0.01) 0.18 (0.09) 0.05 (0.01) 53.14 (4.49) 0.02 (0.04) 0.97 (0.29) 19.27 (1.30) .179
95% CI [0.65, 0.09]
Mortality 46.96 (0.53) 0.88 (0.14) 0.07 (0.02) 0.09 (0.12) 0.11 (0.03) 64.92 (5.66) 0.09 (0.07) 0.27 (0.51) 18.15 (1.34) .227
95% CI [1.47, 0.29]
Physical: Maximum
walking distance
Age 50.02 (0.59) 0.99 (0.09) 0.04 (0.01) 0.42 (0.10) 0.03 (0.01) 48.70 (5.00) 0.08 (0.05) 0.47 (0.31) 29.88 (1.66) .311
95% CI [1.54, 0.44]
Mortality 44.67 (0.57) 1.70 (0.15) 0.06 (0.02) 0.02 (0.13) 0.00 (0.03) 69.79 (6.38) 0.30 (0.12) 2.83 (0.80) 26.43 (1.65) .347
95% CI [2.77, 0.63]
Health: Body mass
index
Age 48.33 (0.51) 0.12 (0.08) 0.04 (0.01) 0.10 (0.09) 0.05 (0.01) 39.95 (4.10) 0.10 (0.05) 0.44 (0.29) 13.09 (0.85) .071
95% CI [ 0.74, 0.50]
Mortality 48.41 (0.67) 0.43 (0.19) 0.02 (0.01) 0.15 (0.16) 0.01 (0.04) 48.27 (4.30) 0.42 (0.14) 1.65 (0.62) 11.81 (0.89) .162
95% CI [1.70, 0.84]
Social: Social
participation
Age 50.03 (0.55) 0.82 (0.11) 0.03 (0.02) 0.20 (0.11) 0.02 (0.02) 38.77 (5.17) 0.12 (0.07) 0.61 (0.31) 23.25 (2.35) .287
95% CI [1.50, 0.14]
Mortality 44.20 (0.62) 1.65 (0.20) 0.01 (0.04) 0.44 (0.21) 0.08 (0.05) 59.06 (7.40) 0.00 (0.19) 1.53 (1.11) 24.51 (2.89) .249
95% CI [1.65, 1.65]
Self: Emotional
balance
Age 49.71 (0.66) 0.07 (0.11) 0.03 (0.01) 0.09 (0.11) 0.03 (0.02) 66.54 (6.92) 0.07 (0.07) 0.52 (0.30) 26.72 (2.38) .064
95% CI [0.59, 0.45]
Mortality 49.13 (0.63) 0.42 (0.18) 0.05 (0.02) 0.00 (0.14) 0.05 (0.03) 83.99 (8.35) 0.13 (0.12) 0.62 (0.21) 26.26 (2.54) .081
95% CI [1.13, 0.29]
Note. Ns range between 420 (Body mass index) and 439 (Social participation) who provided between 678 (social participation) and 1,090 observations
(Categories). Pseudo-R2 was calculated as proportional reduction in residual variance from unconditional means model. Unstandardized estimates and
standard errors are presented. Level 2 indicates the extent of the association between differences in intercept and within-person rates of change and Time
1 (T1) age or time-to-death. 95% CI (confidence intervals) indicate range of between-person differences in rates of change in brackets. Categories  index
of crystallized abilities (fluency); participants were asked to name as many animals as possible in 90 s; Hearing  measured separately for each ear using
a Bosch ST-20–1 pure-tone audiometer with headphones; scores represent an inverted average of thresholds in dB across both ears and four frequencies
(1.00, 2.00, 4.00, and 6.00 kHz). Maximum walking distance  index of lower body function; measured by self-report on a scale ranging from 0 (not being
able to walk) to 7 (being able to walk five kilometers or more); Body mass index  calculated from height and weight of the participants as kg/m2; Social
participation  unit weight composite across social activities reported in the semistructured Yesterday Interview (e.g., attending cultural events, visiting
people) and an Activity List (e.g., restaurant visits, dancing, volunteer work, playing games; see Lövdén et al., 2005); Emotional balance  based on
composites generated across 10 items of positive affect (e.g., enthusiastic, excited, proud) and 10 items of negative items (e.g., distressed, afraid, upset)
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988); scores were calculated as positive affect  negative affect. T-scores were standardized
to cross-sectional Berlin Aging Sample Studysample at T1 (N  516, M  50, SD  10). In the age models, intercepts are centered at age 85. In the
mortality models, intercepts are centered at 2 years prior to death. Ttd  Time-to death.
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